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Crowdsourcing Land Use

∗

Lee Anne Fennell†
Could the future of public land use control lie, quite
literally, in the hands of the public? Local governments have
increasingly embraced new technologies like smartphone apps
and online interfaces for involving constituents in land use
planning and control.1 The possibility that we could effectively
2
“crowdsource” land use decisions through novel public
engagement tools is an intriguing one that is beginning to attract
3
scholarly attention. If land use conflicts represent information
∗
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1
See infra Part I (presenting and discussing examples).
2
The term “crowdsourcing” was coined by Jeff Howe. Jeff Howe, The Rise of
Crowdsourcing, WIRED 14.06 (June 2006), http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/
14.06/crowds.html. In his book on the topic, Howe describes crowdsourcing as “an
umbrella term for a highly varied group of approaches that share one obvious attribute
in common: they all depend on some contribution from the crowd.” JEFF HOWE,
CROWDSOURCING: WHY THE POWER OF THE CROWD IS DRIVING THE FUTURE OF
BUSINESS 280 (2008). I will use the term in a similarly loose manner here, while
recognizing that the term may be more or less apt for different forms of user-based
involvement in land use planning. See Jennifer Shkabatur, Cities @ Crossroads: Digital
Technology and Local Democracy in America, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1413, 1443-44 (2011)
(defining “governmental crowdsourcing” as “the process of outsourcing certain
governmental functions to the broad public, and soliciting back services, suggestions,
solutions, and ideas”). The idea of crowdsourcing builds on ideas that were recently
popularized in, for example, JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (2004); a
much earlier antecedent is the Condorcet Jury Theorem. See, e.g., Matthew C.
Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422,
1462-63 (2011) (citing Marquis de Condorcet, Essay on the Application of Mathematics
to the Theory of Decision-Making (1785), reprinted in CONDORCET: SELECTED WRITINGS
33 (Keith Michael Baker ed., 1976)).
3
See, e.g., Daren C. Brabham, Crowdsourcing the Public Participation
Process for Planning Projects, 8 PLANNING THEORY 242 (2009); Shkabatur, supra note
2, at 1472-76; Jennifer S. Evans-Cowley, There’s an App for That: Mobile Applications
for Urban Planning (Oct. 29, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1951069; see also Patricia E. Salkin, Social Networking and
Land Use Planning and Regulation: Practical Benefits, Pitfalls, and Ethical
Considerations, 31 PACE L. REV. 54 (2011); Julie A. Tappendorf, To Tweet or Not to
Tweet: Use of Social Networking in Land Use Planning and Regulation, 34 ZONING AND
LAND PLANNING LAW REPORT, no. 5, May 2012, at 1. Land use planning is just one area
†
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shortfalls,4 finding better ways to aggregate the information
dispersed among various members of the public seems like a
promising strategy.5
Without
question,
technological
advances
can
dramatically reduce the cost of informational inputs into land
use coordination. But the usefulness of these inputs depends on
the theoretical and institutional frameworks within which they
are employed.6 By drawing connections between emerging
information technologies and the chronic information problems
that produce land use conflicts, it becomes possible to
reimagine the government’s role in land use coordination. This
essay makes a start on that project.
Two points bear emphasis at the outset. First, land use
decisionmaking is already “crowdsourced” in important ways—
at least if the term is read broadly to include all aggregations of
widely dispersed information. Citizens provide informational
inputs into land use control through market decisions,7 political

in which crowdsourcing and related public engagement approaches might be employed
by governmental entities. See generally Shkabatur, supra note 2; William D. Eggers &
Rob Hamill, Five Ways Crowdsourcing Can Transform the Public Sphere, GOVERNING
(May 23, 2012), http://www.governing.com/columns/mgmt-insights/col-governmentcrowdsourcing-five-models.html (describing a variety of crowdsourcing initiatives);
David Lepeska, Coming Soon: Twitter as a Citywide Suggestions Box, NEXT AM. CITY,
(Oct. 1, 2012, 9:30 AM), http://americancity.org/daily/entry/coming-soon-twitter-as-citysuggestions-box.
4
The Coase Theorem holds that parties will bargain to an efficient solution
in the absence of transaction costs. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 8 (1960). Information problems—whether private information about
valuations that enables strategic behavior or a simple lack of knowledge about
potential uses and their impacts—contribute greatly to the costs of transacting. See
Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against “Coaseanism,” 99 YALE L.J. 611,
615-16 (1989).
5
The idea of making use of dispersed information appears prominently in
President Obama’s 2009 Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies on Transparency and Open Government: “Knowledge is widely dispersed in
society, and public officials benefit from having access to that dispersed knowledge.”
Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685, 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009), cited
and discussed in Shkabatur, supra note 2, at 1443.
6
Likewise, institutional design should be informed by the costs and
incentives surrounding information acquisition and use. See generally Stephenson,
supra note 2. For a critical look at the enthusiasm surrounding “many minds” models,
and some helpful distinctions among them, see Adrian Vermeule, Many-Minds
Arguments in Legal Theory, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (2009).
7
See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Information and Economic Behavior, in 4
COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW: THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION 136, 140
(1984) (“From the viewpoint of the society as a whole, prices are signals by which
information about scarcities is transmitted among the members of society.”); F.A.
Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 526-28 (1945)
(emphasizing the ability of the price system to aggregate dispersed information and
successfully channel the use of resources).
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participation,8 Tieboutian sorting,9 and responses to a variety of
governmentally constructed choices.10 The institution of
property itself delegates agenda-setting to owners11 and thereby
widely disperses decisionmaking over the use of land.
Governmental bodies have also tried for decades to spur direct
public engagement in land use decisionmaking.12 What is new,
then, is not the idea of aggregating dispersed information, but
rather the prospect of combining technological and theoretical
advances to do so in novel and powerful ways.
Second, the law’s role in the land use arena extends
beyond information collection and aggregation. Government
must get involved in land use decisionmaking not only because
private mechanisms do not (yet) exist to reliably aggregate and
deploy information, but also because society’s normative
commitments place constraints on the sorts of preferences and
8

See, e.g., ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 15-20 (1970)
(contrasting political participation (“voice”) with market decisions (“exit”)).
9
See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64
J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). Tiebout analogized the choice among local governments to a
shopping trip; residents sort themselves into jurisdictions by selecting the bundles of
taxes and services that best match their preferences. See id. at 422.
10
For example, taxes, subsidies, liability rules, and tradable permits all
present agents with choices that both influence behavior and harness information. See,
e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An
Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 725 (1996) (discussing the informationharnessing properties of liability rules).
11
See, e.g., Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U.
TORONTO L.J. 275, 289-93 (2008) (presenting the idea of owners as “agenda setters”);
Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1728, 1754-55
(2004) (discussing property as delegation).
12
See, e.g., James Q. Wilson, Planning and Politics: Citizen Participation in
Urban Renewal, 29 J. AM. INST. OF PLANNERS 242 (1963). A variety of creative
participatory techniques have been used, many of which do not depend on advanced
technology. See, e.g., STEFANO DI GESSA ET AL., INT’L LAND COAL., PARTICIPATORY
MAPPING
AS
A
TOOL
FOR
EMPOWERMENT
21
(2009),
available
at
http://www.landcoalition.org/publications/participatory-mapping-tool-empowerment
(describing a project that involved the public in creating physical three-dimensional
maps in the Philippines); Andrew Leonard, House’s Collaboration Cart Puts
Community Planning on the Street, GRIST (Nov. 20, 2011), http://grist.org/cities/201111-20-houses-collaboration-cart-puts-community-planning-on-the-street (describing a
physical cart containing tools for collecting public reactions, and a park renovation
project in New York’s Chinatown in which residents were encouraged to write or draw
their ideas and wishes on paper lanterns); Oversized Cake Gets NDG Residents
Talking, CBC NEWS (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/
story/2011/11/18/mtl-cake.html (chocolate cake replica of a neighborhood placed
alongside a table “where passing people could write their hopes for the
neighbourhood”); see also James Brasuell, Draft Burbank General Plan is Both
Adorable and Progressive, CURBED LA (Mar. 30, 2012), http://la.curbed.com/archives/
2012/03/proposed_burbank_general_plan_is_both_adorable_and_progressive.php
(discussing Burbank’s use of an avatar known as “Planner Andy” to “help crowdsource
ideas about how residents view their city,” and Burbank’s suggestion that Andy be
printed out and photographed around the city).
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projects that may be pursued. No amount of crowdsourcing can
remove governmental responsibility over certain normative
objectives, such as countering discrimination. This observation
places limits on the use of new information aggregation tools,
but it does not mean that these tools present unusual or unique
risks. On the contrary, a conscious focus on crowdsourcing may
usefully pull apart normative and empirical questions that have
been conflated in existing land use decision processes and place
new emphasis on the government’s normative obligations.
The essay proceeds in two steps. Part I connects past
theoretical work to three types of information that technology
can make more affordable: land use impacts as they exist on the
ground, landowners’ future plans, and preferences for patterns of
land use. Part II examines how government’s role in coordinating
land uses might shift away from top-down regulation and toward
the design of platforms for collecting and using information.13 This
analysis suggests a revised understanding of local governments
as information collectors, aggregators, brokers, and managers
who are also charged with pursuing certain normative goals.
I.

INFORMATION SHORTFALLS AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES

Land use inefficiencies largely boil down to information
failures.14 Information about land use intentions, impacts, and
valuations is fragmented among a multitude of owners and
other constituents who are distributed across time and space. If
bargaining were costless, this dispersed information would be
automatically aggregated in the process of making land use
deals.15 The result would be an efficient set of spatial and
temporal adjacencies and use patterns. Perfect insurance
markets would allow actors to hedge their bets in ways that
would make them risk neutral, eradicating NIMBYism—at

13

See Shkabatur, supra note 2, at 1460-63 (citing Tim O’Reilly, Government
as a Platform, in OPEN GOVERNMENT: COLLABORATION, TRANSPARENCY, AND
PARTICIPATION IN PRACTICE 11, 13 (Daniel Lathrop & Laurel Ruma eds., 2010))
(discussing and critiquing the view of government as “platform provider” that has
emerged in the context of digital initiatives); see also infra Part II.
14
This follows from the large role that information costs play in raising the
costs of transactions and in generating strategic behavior. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra
note 4, at 615-16.
15
See generally Coase, supra note 4. A primary impediment to the efficient
resolution of land use conflicts is strategic behavior that stems from private
information about reservation prices. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, The Property Rights
Doctrine and Demand Revelation Under Incomplete Information, in 4 ARROW, supra
note 7, at 216-18; Ellickson, supra note 4, at 616 n.25.
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least to the extent that actors are free of irrational prejudices.16
In a world of zero transaction costs, property rights in all land
uses and their impacts could be established and perfectly
priced; all potential land use conflicts could be instantly sorted
out to an efficient resolution.17
In the real world, landowners need institutional help in
coordinating their uses. Spatial adjacencies have traditionally
been managed through some mix of nuisance law, zoning, and
covenants. These tools implicitly or explicitly proceed from
empirical judgments about impacts, preferences, and future
plans. For example, residential uses are separated from
commercial uses on the assumption that impacts emanating
from the latter will negatively affect the former. As debates
over mixed-use districts suggest, however, these judgments are
open to question.18
Temporal adjacencies raise analogous but distinct
issues, and managing them also requires empirical judgments
and predictions. Trusts and the doctrine of waste offer different
models for reconciling the interests of successive possessors.19
The fee simple estate, which extends forward indefinitely in
time, might be expected to obviate concerns about temporal
spillovers: any negative effects on the land should show up in
resale values.20 Information problems remain, however.

16

NIMBY is a well-known acronym for “not in my backyard.” To say that full
information would make NIMBYism unproblematic is not to say that everyone would
want everything in their own backyards all the time. Rather, decisions would be based
on the expected value of impacts, and positive-value projects would get optimally placed
rather than excluded altogether. In other words, YIMBYs (“yes in my backyard” types)
would balance out NIMBYs—at least to the extent that a given project is a worthwhile one
and actors are rational. The possibility that irrational prejudices could persist even in a
world of costless bargaining connects to the problem of illegitimate preferences.
17
For example, one landowner might own the right to play music at a certain
level or another landowner might hold an entitlement not to be subjected to decibels
above a certain level, with exceptions and refinements costlessly negotiated. An
efficient resolution might or might not be a normatively attractive one. Not only could
there be unwanted distributive effects in some efficient resolutions, there are some
preferences (such as racial prejudices) that for normative reasons should not be
vindicated, regardless of willingness to pay. Addressing these concerns requires a
continuing governmental role in land use control, beyond merely overcoming
information shortfalls. See infra Part II.
18
See, e.g., NICOLE STELLE GARNETT, ORDERING THE CITY: LAND USE,
POLICING, AND THE RESTORATION OF URBAN AMERICA 64-76 (2010) (discussing Jane
Jacobs’s view that increased informal surveillance in mixed-use areas would lead to
lower crime rates and empirical work suggesting otherwise, as well as the possibility
that there are improvements in quality of life not captured in the crime statistics).
19
See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 216-18 (7th ed. 2010).
20
See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM.
ECON. REV., no. 2, 1967, at 347, 355 (describing a private landowner as “a broker whose
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Efficient shifts in land use over time often require changes in
the physical scope or scale of ownership—it may be necessary
to assemble land into larger tracts or disassemble it into
smaller parcels. Achieving these reconfigurations can present
difficult bargaining dynamics, given the existence of private
information about reservation prices. These problems cannot be
forestalled ex ante without accurately predicting future
efficient scales;21 they cannot be addressed coercively ex post (as
through eminent domain) without confronting serious
valuation problems.22
For all these reasons, better information can improve
the management of land use adjacencies. But there are two
problems. First, information is notoriously costly and should
not be acquired beyond the point where it produces net
marginal gains.23 Second, some types of information can impede
rather than ease bargaining; knowing more about a situation
may enable parties to behave strategically, or it may offer them
ammunition for interpreting facts in ways favorable to their
own interests.24 The emergence of new technologies that lower
the cost of acquiring information would be expected to shift the
efficient level of information acquisition upward, but
information acquisition must be coupled with theoretical
advances that make information useful and that sidestep selfinterested behavior. Technological and theoretical advances
must be considered in tandem, then, to usefully transform land
use decision processes.
wealth depends on how well he takes into account the competing claims of the present
and the future”).
21
See Larissa Katz, Red Tape and Gridlock, 23 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE
99, 120-21 (2010) (challenging the idea that we can identify a resource’s “ideal use” in
advance and arrange property rights to achieve it).
22
As has been well noted, owners may assign a subjective value to their
property that is well in excess of its market value. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The
Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 83 (1986). There have been many
efforts to design mechanisms that would uncover or approximate owners’ subjective
values, but the problem remains a very difficult one.
23
George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213, 224
(1961) (“Ignorance is like subzero weather: by a sufficient expenditure its effects upon
people can be kept within tolerable or even comfortable bounds, but it would be wholly
uneconomic entirely to eliminate all its effects.”).
24
See, e.g., Gary D. Libecap, Contracting for Property Rights, in PROPERTY
RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 142, 161-62 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S.
McChesney eds., 2003) (explaining how bargaining in the context of oil unitization can
be more successful at an earlier stage when less information is known and parties do
not know whether a given formula will work to their advantage or disadvantage);
Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of
Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109 (1997) (discussing the impact of selfserving bias on bargaining dynamics).
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The sections below show how addressing three types of
information shortfalls might produce gains that have been
outlined in existing theoretical work. First, information about
impacts could support a shift from a land use control system
that focuses on use classifications or inputs to one that focuses
on impacts or outcomes. Second, information about intentions
could build more “precaution” into land use choices, as through
the increased use of options to coordinate land use ex ante.25
Third, information about desired use patterns can support
innovations that harness interdependent decisionmaking and
address associational spillovers.
A.

Land Use Impacts

Zoning decisions proceed on assumptions about the
impacts of various land uses on other land uses. Presumed
land-on-land spillovers form a primary rationale for separating
uses or for privileging particularly sensitive uses, such as singlefamily residences. Likewise, housing code enforcement and
police priorities are often driven by assumptions about the
effects of certain kinds of violations and conditions on quality of
life.26 Land use regulation usually proceeds by ruling out
categories of uses or requiring particular property
configurations, such as minimum setbacks. Yet the actual
impacts of particular uses and configurations are often
unknown—at least to local government officials and in-movers.
Not only could such information improve traditional use-based
zoning, it could also support performance zoning that is
directly based on land use impacts.27

25

See generally Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Precaution, 4 J. TORT L., no.
2, at 1 (2011).
26
The “broken windows” hypothesis, which has been challenged empirically,
embodies some of these assumptions. See, e.g., GARNETT, supra note 18, at 21-26.
27
Although the term “performance zoning” covers a range of approaches, the
basic idea involves relying less on use categories and more on actual impacts. See, e.g.,
JANE JACOBS, DARK AGE AHEAD 153-57 (2004) (discussing advantages of a
“performance code” that addresses concerns about noises, odors, traffic, and other
impacts); DOUGLAS R. PORTER ET AL., FLEXIBLE ZONING: HOW IT WORKS 11 (1988)
(“Theoretically, in a regulatory system based solely on performance standards, any use
could locate adjacent to any other use, provided that it could satisfy the criteria and
standards contained in the ordinance.”); Frederick W. Acker, Note, Performance
Zoning, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 363 (1991) (explaining the rationale for performance
zoning and comparing proposals). One challenge in implementing performance
standards is the difficulty of monitoring for violations. Martin Jaffe, Performance
Zoning: A Reassessment, 45 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Mar. 1993, at 3, 4 (discussing
this problem in the context of industrial performance controls).
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Zoners and planners are not entirely in the dark about
impacts. Hedonic regression analysis can measure the effects of
particular uses—from wind turbines to community gardens—
on neighboring property values.28 Grounding land use decisions
in these data represents a considerable advance over
proceeding by intuition. But the results can be complicated by
the fact that property values are based on expectations about
impacts, rather than the impacts themselves. Moreover, the
expectations in question are not only those held by buyers, but
also those that buyers imagine third parties hold.29 Once the
risk aversion that typically accompanies residential ownership
is added to the mix,30 the discount associated with a particular
land use may diverge considerably from that use’s actual
effects on consumption utility.
The current level of governmental ignorance about
impacts is not inevitable. It could be overcome by harnessing
information that already exists, dispersed in the hands of the
public. People residing within, commuting through, or just
visiting a jurisdiction collectively possess a lot of information
about land uses and conditions within the jurisdiction,
including details about the intensity and prevalence of certain
uses, and their effects on quality of life. Some questions, such
as the noise levels produced by certain kinds of machinery and
the degree to which the noise interferes with different sorts of
activities, are matters on which knowledgeable individuals
across the country or around the world may have insight.
Finding ways to obtain the scattered information these
sources possess is a challenge, but one that might be
approached with some optimism. Consumers volunteer
enormous amounts of information about their experiences with
28

See, e.g., DENISE DIPASQUALE & WILLIAM C. WHEATON, URBAN ECONOMICS
REAL ESTATE MARKETS 189-90 (1996) (describing the hedonic approach to valuing
housing attributes and describing some difficulties associated with using it); Vicki
Been & Ioan Voicu, The Effect of Community Gardens on Neighboring Property Values,
36 REAL ESTATE ECON. 241 (2008); Yasin Sunak & Reinhard Madlener, The Impact of
Wind Farms on Property Values: A Geographically Weighted Hedonic Pricing Model
(Future Energy Consumer Needs & Behavior, Working Paper No. 03/2012, 2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2114216 (applying a hedonic pricing model to
determine the effects of wind farms on property values in western Germany).
29
The problem is familiar to anyone who has studied stock market bubbles.
John Maynard Keynes famously described the stock market as a beauty contest in
which participants are asked not who they find most beautiful but who they expect
everyone else to find most beautiful. See David Kestenbaum, Ranking Cute Animals: A
Stock
Market
Experiment,
NPR
PLANET
MONEY
(Jan.
14,
2011),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2011/01/04/132906135/ranking-cute-animals-a-stockmarket-experiment (describing an experiment based on Keynes’s insight).
30
See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 9-12 (2001).
AND
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products and services, including location-specific reactions to
hotels, apartments, parks, and even neighborhoods.31 This
information is not presently elicited or aggregated in a way
that is likely to be very useful for land use control purposes.32
But it could be.
What is necessary are a set of conditions that both
enable and motivate people who possess the relevant
information to reveal it. Providing the ability to contribute
information, which requires developing and distributing
appropriate technologies, is likely the easier part of the equation
to solve. Some localities, nonprofits, and entrepreneurs have
already begun experimenting with smartphone apps that allow
people to report observed problems like potholes or
malfunctioning streetlamps on the fly. Perhaps the best known
of these is the SeeClickFix smartphone app used by a number of
local governments, modeled on the earlier FixMyStreet app
developed in the United Kingdom.33 Other apps, such as
Widenoise, are designed to monitor localized conditions—in this
case, ambient noise levels.34 Similar in spirit are kite
photography programs for recording local conditions35 and
“Bucket Brigade” initiatives that allow citizens to collect and
report real-time, localized air quality results.36
While these approaches represent only early examples
of how land use data collection might proceed, they
31

See, e.g., APARTMENTRATINGS, http://www.apartmentratings.com (last
visited Sept. 5, 2012); TRIPADVISOR, http://www.tripadvisor.com (last visited Sept. 5,
2012); YELP, http://www.yelp.com (last visited Sept. 5, 2012).
32
Indeed, confusion about the subject of discussion appears to reign in some
online fora. For example, one review in Yelp’s listing for Chicago’s Lincoln Park began,
“Is this a review of an entire neighborhood or just for the parks?” Jim O’s Review,
Lincoln Park, YELP (June 11, 2009), http://www.yelp.com/biz/lincoln-park-chicago#
hrid:-oewnWvOIz4wNgfQ31gIBA.
33
FIXMYSTREET, http://www.fixmystreet.com (last visited Sept. 5, 2012);
SEECLICKFIX, http://www.seeclickfix.com (last visited Sept. 5, 2012); see also Shkabatur,
supra note 2, at 1447-48 (discussing these and similar apps). Another variation on this
theme is BlightStatus, an app that allows citizens in New Orleans to report, and track
governmental responses to, blighted conditions. See Emily Badger, Revitalizing New
Orleans
by
Crowdsourcing
Renewal,
CO.EXIST
(Oct.
19,
2012),
http://www.fastcoexist.com/1680759/revitalizing-new-orleans-by-crowdsourcing-renewal.
34
See WideNoise, Ever Heard of Sound Pollution?, EVERYAWARE,
http://cs.everyaware.eu/event/widenoise (last visited Feb. 21, 2013); see also EvansCowley, supra note 3, at 5 (discussing Widenoise and the potential that such a
“[p]articipatory sensing” application could improve land use planning).
35
See, e.g., Martijn de Waal, How Kite Photography Can Empower Local
Communities, MOBILE CITY (Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.themobilecity.nl/2011/
10/19/how-kite-photography-can-empower-local-communities/.
36
LOUISIANA BUCKET BRIGADE, http://www.labucketbrigade.org (last visited
Sept. 19, 2012).
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demonstrate the potential of new technologies to collect, in real
time, broadly dispersed information related to land use. A set
of impact indexes might be developed to which the public could
be invited to contribute both qualitative and quantitative
information. Contributions might be actively solicited from
those who live near a given use or commute past it.37 Of course,
the challenge of achieving optimal levels of participation
remains—a point that will be discussed further below.38
We might also worry about the accuracy and
representativeness of the information submitted. This concern
is heightened when some of the people in the best position to
know about a given impact also have a vested interest in the
magnitude of that impact. These interests might cut in
different directions. For example, a homeowner poised to sell
might want to understate the impact of the cheese factory next
door, while a long-time resident who is lobbying to get the
factory shut down might want to overstate its impact. Concerns
about biased feedback are nothing new, but there are some
mechanisms for dealing with them, including reputational
ratings.39 Moreover, in some impact contexts, information
gathered from one community (say, about the noise level
associated with a particular kind of turbine) can be used
elsewhere, reducing the chance of gaming.
Nonetheless, rollouts of new impact-detecting apps must
be carefully managed to reduce the risk of systematic biases.
For example, we might not expect people who are early
adopters of a noise-detecting app to be representative along the
dimension of noise tolerance, nor would we expect them to be
evenhanded in choosing when to measure impacts. As a first
cut, a governmental body could wait until it has collected
commitments from a cross-section of the population to
participate in an impact-gathering program before launching
it. Alternatively, local governments might consider relatively
localized pilot projects involving proprietary governmental
37

Local governments have developed mapping programs based on
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) technology to study commuting patterns. Such
applications may make it possible to identify people who are likely to commute along a
given pathway. See, e.g., Eric Coumou, ESRI Map Book Gallery Vol. 22: Carson Valley
Employment and Housing, http://www.esri.com/mapmuseum/mapbook_gallery/volume22/
state_local4.html; see also Evans-Cowley, supra note 3, at 5 (suggesting that people
could volunteer to have their routes tracked and aggregated for transportation
planning purposes).
38
See infra Part II.A.
39
See, e.g., LIOR JACOB STRAHILEVITZ, INFORMATION AND EXCLUSION 127-29
(2011).
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apps (perhaps themselves the product of crowdsourcing
initiatives) provided free of charge, along with the loaned
hardware necessary to run them.40
Local governments could also phase in the use of
crowdsourced impact information, allowing it to play a larger
role in land use policy as publicity builds and participation
grows. For example, noise level information might first be used
to augment other information sources in refining traditional
zoning classifications,41 and only later be used to inform the
development of performance standards. Moreover, performance
zoning approaches that focus on land use impacts need not be
adopted as a stand-alone replacement for existing public land
use controls. They can instead be layered onto Euclidian zoning
as an additional constraint,42 made part of a process through
which a landowner can be selectively released from existing
land use restrictions,43 or combined with other land use control
techniques, such as tradable permits.44
Although these approaches lend themselves most
obviously to the control of spillovers, impact information could
also be used in other ways to improve the quality of the built
environment. If different environments affect people’s
subjective well-being in systematic ways, then the aggregation
of information about these hedonic impacts could usefully
inform both private and governmental land use choices. If the
government learns, for example, that curved residential streets
make people happier than grids (or vice versa), it can use that

40

Approaches based on the Experience Sampling Method (ESM) used in
hedonics, which prompts people at random times throughout the day to report results,
could be used to counter selectivity in the timing of impact measurement. See JOEL M.
HEKTNER ET AL., EXPERIENCE SAMPLING METHOD: MEASURING THE QUALITY OF
EVERYDAY LIFE 6-7 (2007) (describing the ESM and noting some limitations and
drawbacks, including the fact that it can be expensive to implement).
41
Cf. Bradford C. Mank, Preventing Bhopal: “Dead Zones” and Toxic Death
Risk Index Taxes, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 761, 779-84 (1992) (discussing how performance
standards might be used in conjunction with Geographic Information Systems (GIS)
programs to calculate optimal buffer zones around hazardous waste sites).
42
See Robert J. Blackwell, Comment, Overlay Zoning, Performance
Standards, and Environmental Protection After Nollan, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
615, 637-39 (1989); see also generally LANE KENDIG ET AL., PERFORMANCE ZONING
(1980) (presenting a performance zoning proposal that combines use districts with
performance standards).
43
See Anita P. Miller, Rural Development Considerations for Growth
Management, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 781, 789-91 (2003) (describing such an approach
in Rio Arriba County, New Mexico).
44
See John R. Ottensmann, Market-Based Exchanges of Rights Within a
System of Performance Zoning, 1(1) PLAN. & MARKETS (1998), available at http://wwwpam.usc.edu/volume1/v1i1a4s1.html.
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information as an input into street design or make the data
available to private developers or consumers.45
B.

Land Use Intentions

A second area of land use ignorance involves intentions.
Neighbors, prospective in-movers, and governmental bodies
often lack insight into what landowners intend to do with their
properties in the future.46 It is useful to pinpoint the source of
this uncertainty. A system of land use control that is both
flexible enough to adapt to changes in conditions and broadly
framed enough to accommodate heterogeneity among owners
will usually build some unused capacity into most landowners’
entitlements. Thus, most landowners have some ability to
engage in uses that are a bit more intense or that fill a
somewhat larger proportion of the three-dimensional envelope
that defines their spatial claim. They might, for example, be able
to build a second-story addition, grow a row of Sequoia trees,
start a small in-home day care center, or kennel a pack of
hunting dogs in the backyard. These dormant options can make
it difficult for neighbors and potential in-movers (or out-movers)
to predict future uses. And they can make it difficult for zoners
and planners to coordinate land uses over time.
Ignorance about intentions heightens the potential for
costly land use conflicts. A few primary strategies presently
exist for reducing the resulting uncertainty, each of which has
drawbacks of its own. First, local governments already
incentivize the disclosure of future plans when they grant
vested rights or other dispensations as projects move toward
actualization.47 Requiring affirmative steps toward realizing

45

We might wonder why consumers are not already demanding design
choices that make them happier. The answer, explored in more detail in Part I.C, may
be that revealed preferences in the marketplace (or in the Tieboutian analog of a
marketplace) can only respond to available options. Existing options in turn may be
shaped by a variety of factors, including path dependence. See, e.g., Robert C.
Ellickson, The Law and Economics of Street Layouts: How a Grid Pattern Benefits a
Downtown, 64 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2152442 (discussing path dependence and other considerations relevant to
street layout choices, including potential tradeoffs between aesthetics and the
advantages of a grid system).
46
To be sure, the owners themselves may often lack this insight as well. But
owners as a group collectively possess more information about land use intentions than
do those who are charged with making land use policy.
47
See generally Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land
Use Regulations, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222 (2009) (describing and critiquing protections
for existing uses and vested rights).
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one’s intentions before those intentions will be protected does
help to screen for sincerity.48 But this requirement also creates
unwanted pressures towards rushed development.49 Protecting
uses only as they become reality is an information-forcing
device, but it is also a development-forcing device.
Narrowing the band of possible uses through zoning or
other land use controls is another way that local governments
can render land use more predictable. As suggested already,
uncertainty about land use intentions is a function of the gap
between present uses and permitted uses. If that gap is
completely regulated away, the actual use becomes the
maximum use, and uncertainty is removed. Somewhat less
extreme versions of this strategy can be seen in very finely
grained zoning classifications that, for example, divide twofamily homes from three-family homes, and small apartment
buildings from somewhat larger ones. This approach tends
toward regulatory overkill; narrowing the permissible uses in a
given area may rule out uses that would have been efficient to
introduce. Zoning restrictions can be loosened to address this
concern,50 but making zoning more flexible undermines any
certainty that might follow from having the narrow zoning
restrictions in the first place.51
Another approach to uncertainty about intentions
involves direct dealmaking among landowners to remove the
potential for unexpected or unwanted land use changes. Such
dealmaking often occurs on a large, developer-mediated scale
in private residential communities. The webs of covenants that
residents buy into take the narrow zoning classification
strategy described above to a new level. Not only may
permissible uses be defined at a much finer grain than in the
typical zoned neighborhood, the covenants may be more
difficult to alter.52 Yet again, the rigidity comes at a price,
48

See generally Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Identifying Intense Preferences, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 1391 (2009) (discussing various mechanisms that the law uses to
identify sincere or intensely held preferences).
49
See, e.g., Serkin, supra note 47, at 1283.
50
Landowners can, for example, seek variances or attempt to have an area
rezoned; the applicable legal standards will determine how easy or difficult these
moves will be.
51
Performance zoning, discussed in Part I.A., supra, could help to blunt the
effects of uncertainty about uses by controlling cross-border impacts. But it would not
be able to deal well with heterogeneity in sensitivity to impacts, and so might
overregulate or underregulate in a given situation.
52
Common interest communities may require a supermajority to change a
covenant, whereas the ordinary political processes governing zoning are majoritarian.

398

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:2

especially if it imposes uniformity on a larger scale than is
efficient. For example, banning tall trees from an entire
neighborhood may do a good job of protecting the expectations
of those who want sweeping views or solar panels, but it might
also create a less interesting and pleasing community than
would a judicious mix of open vistas and tall trees. To achieve
more fine-grained results, individual landowners could bargain
with each other directly to place limits on future land uses.
Such bargaining may run aground, however, due to high search
costs53 or bilateral monopoly dynamics.54
What is needed—and what new information technologies
can support—is a platform that enables landowners to find each
other and credibly signal their intentions before any dispute
arises between them, without anyone having to break ground on
a given project. Although space does not permit a full description
here, the basic idea is for a governmental body to host a kind of
clearinghouse in which parties can buy and sell options on land
use rights.55 For example, an owner who has no intention of
blocking a beautiful view enjoyed by a neighboring property
might happily transfer an option on the view rights to a
centralized exchange, in return for a modest payment. Later, a
neighbor who wanted to secure those view rights would be able
to purchase them at a preset price. Platforms that enable such
deals among private parties can also provide useful guidance to
local governments about demand levels for different sorts of
land use arrangements.
Information about plans and intentions might do more
than merely forestall conflict; it might also offer new ways to
collaboratively enhance the value that parties derive from their
land.56 Already, new technologies have opened up alternatives
that were previously elusive, such as the possibility that
53

See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty
About Property Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1296 (2008).
54
See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 COLUM.
L. REV. 55, 58-59 (1987).
55
The approach described in the text is explored in Fennell, supra note 25. It
is sometimes suggested that property rights allow owners themselves to serve as a kind
of clearinghouse for the land use rights contained within their default entitlement
bundles. Sterk, supra note 53, at 1295 (citing Smith, supra note 11, at 1728-29). High
search costs and bilateral monopoly dynamics may make the government a better
clearinghouse provider, as long as it can induce owners to provide the necessary
information about what is on offer within the clearinghouse.
56
Of particular interest are initiatives that would facilitate the sharing of
excess capacity. See generally Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods
and the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J.
273 (2004) (explaining the role of excess capacity in social production).
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strangers could share gardens and backyards,57 form carpools,58
and so on. Formatting and delivering information about these
resources to neighbors and potential in-movers could improve
locational decisions by revealing features of the environment
that would otherwise remain undiscovered. Homebuyers can
see public parks on a map, but they cannot see the neighbors
who would be interested in sharing gardening space. Interfaces
that pool such information could also help to uncover shared
interests and foster the kind of “multiplex” interactions that
can help to support social norms among those already in the
community.59 Nextdoor.com offers a social networking space
available only to verified neighbors that might be used to
accomplish similar goals.60
Knowing what current landowners plan to do with their
properties is only one part of the puzzle. Optimizing land use
policy also requires knowing something about how demand for
different land uses will evolve in the future as rounds of entry
and exit occur. Information about economic, employment, and
infrastructure factors that are likely to influence migration and
demand patterns is helpful in this regard, and new GIS-based
forecasting tools can help to uncover it.61 In addition, it is
necessary to gain insight into people’s preferences for patterns
of uses—preferences that are shaped in turn by existing use
patterns. The next section explains.
C.

Land Use Pattern Preferences

Economists rely on the notion of “revealed preferences”—
the idea that we can infer preferences by watching what people
do in the marketplace when their own money is on the line. For
two reasons, however, observing market demand for particular
land uses may be misleading. First, land uses (as opposed to
57

See, e.g., LANDSHARE, http://www.landshare.net (last visited Sept. 10,
2012) (online service matching would-be gardeners without land with people who have
extra land available for gardening).
58
See, e.g., Mickey Meece, Car-Pooling Makes a Surge on Apps and Social
Media, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2012, at B1 (describing the role of sites like Zimride.com
and eRideShare.com in popularizing car-pooling and ride-sharing).
59
See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 179 n.44 (1991).
60
See Randall Stross, Meet Your Neighbors, If Only Online, N.Y. TIMES (May
12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/13/business/on-nextdoorcom-social-networksfor-neighbors.html.
61
See, e.g., Deborah Dennison, ERSI Map Book Gallery Vol. 23: Analyzing
U.S. Household Migration Patterns, http://www.esri.com/mapmuseum/mapbook_gallery/
volume23/statelocal3.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2012).
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land itself) are not the subject of free-market transactions.
Nuisance law, zoning, and other land use controls tightly
constrain what uses may be undertaken on particular parcels.
While there is some ability to negotiate around existing
restrictions, the process is not one that approximates an open
market. Second, the only preferences that can be revealed in
the marketplace are for things that the marketplace offers.
Where particular patterns of land use do not yet exist, it is
difficult to gauge demand for them.62
To approach the point from a different angle,
preferences for land use almost always depend on the uses that
are proximate in time and space, given the degree to which the
values associated with particular concurrent or successive uses
are interdependent. Local governments do not know which
spatial and temporal land use patterns incumbents and
potential in-movers prefer, because governments can only
observe binary (entry and exit) responses to existing patterns.
Such a choice provides no information about preferences for
alternatives that are not available, and may even contribute to
their continued unavailability.63
Models pioneered by Thomas Schelling establish that
when locational decisionmaking is highly interdependent,
patterns can become entrenched or, alternatively, can be
sensitive to unraveling as moves beget other moves.64 Although
Schelling’s work is most closely associated with patterns of
racial segregation and integration, similar points might be
made about movements prompted by other forms of
heterogeneity or homogeneity, or by patterns of aesthetic
elements or land use impacts. Agent-based models can
62

Not only is it impossible for unavailable alternatives to be selected, it may
even be impossible for people to envision them fully enough to form preferences for
them. This is part of a broader set of problems that plague future goods in general,
where market uncertainty runs high. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy,
Intellectual Property for Market Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337 (2008)
(arguing that market uncertainties suppress innovation in the absence of intellectual
property protections for market experimentation); Kenneth J. Arrow, Limited
Knowledge and Economic Analysis, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 9 (1974) (explaining how “the
absence of some markets for future goods may cause others to fail” due to uncertainty,
and discussing general problems of uncertainty due to “technological and taste shifts”).
63
See JOHN H. MILLER & SCOTT E. PAGE, COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF SOCIAL LIFE 17-20 (2007) (presenting
an example in which two cities fail to offer an alternative that a substantial minority
would prefer, yet the situation is at an equilibrium); THOMAS C. SCHELLING,
MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 146 (1978) (“People who have to choose between
polarized extremes—a white neighborhood or a black . . . —will often choose in the way
that reinforces the polarization.”).
64
See SCHELLING, supra note 63, at 147-66.
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simulate patterns of change over time based on particular
conditions and strategies.65 Crowdsourcing could be combined
with these dynamic models in at least three ways.
First, and most simply, new information technologies
could inform the assumptions plugged into agent-based models.
For example, designing a Schelling-type simulation requires
knowing something about preferences for neighbors, and when
moves will be initiated. There are some existing mechanisms
for gathering this information,66 but new technologies offer
flexible opportunities to expand the pool of data and obtain
more fine-grained information about the geographic
distribution of preferences within a metropolitan area.
Second, “the crowd” could become involved in
multiplayer simulations online that are designed to test the
effects of particular changes in land use patterns.67 While most
agent-based models employ simulated agents that follow
particular rules in the manner indicated above, the rise of
massively multiplayer online games (MMOGs) suggests
another possibility—involving actual people in online
interactive simulations. A research group organized under the
name The Responsive City has initiated some interesting work
along these lines,68 including an online design game;69 a broader
research initiative, World of Citycraft, appears to now be

65

See, e.g., MICHAEL BATTY, CITIES AND COMPLEXITY: UNDERSTANDING
CITIES WITH CELLULAR AUTOMATA, AGENT-BASED MODELS, AND FRACTALS 209-16
(2005); Randal C. Picker, SimLaw 2011, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1019, 1023-29.
66
See, e.g., Camille Zubrinsky Charles, Processes of Racial Residential
Segregation, in URBAN INEQUALITY: EVIDENCE FROM FOUR CITIES 217, 233-64 (Alice
O’Connor et al. eds., 2001) (describing “show card” methodology for eliciting
preferences about neighborhood racial composition and presenting results of a multicity study); Maria Krysan et al., Does Race Matter in Neighborhood Preferences?
Results from a Video Experiment, 115 AM. J. SOC. 527 (2009) (presenting the results of
a study examining differences in ratings of neighborhoods based on video vignettes,
where all neighborhood features were held constant except the races of the people
appearing in the vignette).
67
Urban simulations have a long history, reaching back into the 1950s. See
Igor Mayer et al., Beyond SimCity: Urban Gaming and Multi-Actor Systems, in MODEL
TOWN: USING URBAN SIMULATION IN NEW TOWN PLANNING 168, 169-71 (2009)
(providing a succinct history). For some relatively early treatments, see generally
Richard L. Meier, “Game” Procedure in the Simulation of Cities, in THE URBAN
CONDITION: PEOPLE AND POLICY IN THE METROPOLIS 348 (Leonard J. Duhl ed., 1963);
JOHN L. TAYLOR, INSTRUCTIONAL PLANNING SYSTEMS: A GAMING-SIMULATION
APPROACH TO URBAN PROBLEMS (1971).
68
See TReC—The Responsive City, www.theresponsivecity.org (last visited
Sept. 19, 2012).
69
See Ekim Tan & Juval Portugali, The Responsive City Design Game, in
COMPLEXITY THEORIES OF CITIES HAVE COME OF AGE 369 (Juval Portugali et al. eds., 2012).
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underway.70 Similarly, Mojang and UN Habitat used the
popular Minecraft platform as a foundation for their new Block
by Block project, which allows residents to collaborate in
virtual space over potential changes to the surrounding area.71
Third, and most ambitiously, online interfaces could be
used to get potential owners and land users to conditionally
commit to particular courses of action, contingent on others
agreeing to do the same. Antecedents of this approach include
“money-back” guarantees for contributions to public goods72
and, more generally, the idea of contingent markets.73 The
ability to execute binding property instruments—covenants
and easements capable of running with the land—would be
necessary elements of this approach. As such, a workable
conditional commitment interface would require considerable
institutional support. Yet it also represents one of the most
exciting possibilities for making use of distributed information
about preferences to construct alternatives that do not
presently exist.
II.

LAND USE CONTROL AS PLATFORM DESIGN

At least one commentator has suggested that new
technologies could profoundly alter, if not eliminate altogether,
the role of land use planners.74 The examples above might seem
70

See World of Citycraft Wins “Kom Je Ook?” 6, TREC,
http://www.theresponsivecity.org/2010/11/02/woc-world-of-citycraft/ (last visited Sept.
19, 2012). The name echoes that of the popular MMOG, World of Warcraft.
71
Carl Manneh, Mojang and UN Presents: Block by Block, MOJANG (Sept. 5,
2012), http://www.mojang.com/2012/09/mojang-and-un-presents-block-by-block/. The Block
by Block project originated in the Mina Kvarter (“My Blocks”) project launched by Svensk
Byggtjänst (Swedish Building Services) to address outdated housing projects in Sweden.
See Carl Manneh, Minecraft Empowers People to Change Their Block, MOJANG (Oct. 27,
2011), http://www.mojang.com/2011/10/minecraft-empowers-people-to-change-their-block/.
72
See Robyn M. Dawes et al., Organizing Groups for Collective Action, 80 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 1171, 1172 (1986) (describing the successful use of a “money back
guarantee device” by The Association of Oregon Faculties in raising the lump sum
necessary to hire a lobbyist—“a public good for all faculty members because any pay
increases he produced would go to all faculty in the system”). For a recent analysis of
the potential uses and limits of such money-back guarantees, see generally Julia Y.
Lee, Gaining Assurances, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 1137.
73
See Arrow, supra note 62, at 9 (“Instead of letting uncertainty ruin existing
markets, we can take it explicitly into account by buying and selling commitments to be
carried out only if some uncertain event occurs.”). Although Arrow uses the example of a
“conceivable technological innovation” as the uncertain event, the uncertain event might
instead be the collected commitments of a number of other local residents or landowners.
74
See John D. Landis, A Brave and Better World? The iPad and the Future of
Planning, PLANETIZEN (Feb. 7, 2012, 2:00 PM), http://www.planetizen.com/node/54337
(discussing the possibility that algorithms could eventually perform many of the tasks
that planners now perform).
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to raise the question of whether ongoing government
involvement will be necessary at all. If we understand land use
inefficiencies as largely stemming from information failures,
and if government involvement serves only as a stand-in for
the bargains that would automatically aggregate that
then
efficient
information
aggregation
information,75
technologies might appear capable of usurping public land use
controls altogether. Might not the dominant form of “postzoning” land use control be generated by the public at large,
once the appropriate (and appropriately crowdsourced) apps
have been developed?
Yes and no. It is not hard to predict that emerging
technologies will increase the degree to which dispersed
information is used in land use decisionmaking. When the cost
of an input goes down, more of that input will be demanded, and
there is no reason to expect a different result where information
is involved. At the same time, governmental entities will retain
a critically important role in designing, managing, adapting, and
refining appropriately scaled platforms for aggregating and
using this information.76 The discussion below focuses on three
facets of this design work: optimizing participation, putting
insights from behavioral law and economics to work, and
incorporating normative commitments.
A.

Optimizing Participation

Crowdsourcing depends on participation. There are
three basic challenges in optimizing that participation77:
deciding who should count as part of the crowd, motivating
participation at appropriate levels, and constraining the
crowd’s influence in ways that are consistent with the local
government’s normative commitments.78

75

See generally Coase, supra note 4.
Other commentators have used and critiqued the “platform” metaphor.
See, e.g., Shkabatur, supra note 2, at 1460-63.
77
These considerations, variously enumerated, have appeared in other
treatments of crowdsourcing. See, e.g., HOWE, supra note 2, at 278-88 (listing ten “rules
of crowdsourcing” that include “pick the right crowd” and “offer the right incentives”);
Vermeule, supra note 6, at 24-38 (noting concerns with “many minds” models in law,
including the question of “whose minds,” and the need to make “many minds versus
other values” tradeoffs).
78
This third point represents just one way in which information platforms
might incorporate normative values; see also infra Part II.C.
76
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1. Defining the Crowd
The first set of design questions, tightly connected to
questions of scale, is whose participation will be solicited. To
begin, we must assume that there is some “deciding
jurisdiction” that allows “the crowd’s” input to inform whatever
land use decision that jurisdiction is contemplating. For
example, a municipality might be deciding whether to zone
land for low-income housing. An initial question is whether the
municipal level offers the appropriate scale for making that
land use decision, or whether incentive misalignments are
already built into the scale of land use power. In the case of
low-income housing, for example, municipalities may attempt
to offload fiscal burdens onto neighboring jurisdictions. If such
misalignments exist, then improving the technologies through
which land use power is exercised may well be
counterproductive—unless something else is done to address
the underlying problem of scale.
This is not a trivial concern. Land use control is a
primary area in which local governments can offload costs onto
other jurisdictions and behave in a manner that is detrimental
to regional interests. Thus, some types of land use
crowdsourcing might work too well in communicating selfinterested landowner views to local governments, creating
political pressure for governmental actors to behave selfishly (or
providing an excuse for doing so). Indeed, if one takes a
sufficiently pessimistic view of the political economy of land use
controls, it would seem better to unmoor land use
decisionmaking from the interests of constituents,79 rather than
to tighten those connections through new feedback mechanisms.
There are two responses. The first is that NIMBYism
and exclusionary land use policies have historically thrived
without smartphones or web interfaces. Homeowner interests
were hardly attenuated from or underrepresented in land use
policy during the pre-Internet era. This does not tell us
whether enhanced participation tools would make matters

79

Elsewhere I have examined one way of doing so: lowering the stake that
homeowners (who tend to be the decisive political actors in most local jurisdictions)
have in the portions of their home value attributable to local land use (and other
“offsite”) decisions. See generally Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW. U. L.
REV. 1047 (2008). For further discussion of the political influence and motivations of
homeowners, as well as potential responses to homeowner risk aversion (including
home equity insurance), see generally FISCHEL, supra note 30.
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better or worse, but it does suggest something about the
baseline from which we are working.
The second response is that new information
technologies could offer ways to improve the alignment
between inputs to land use decisions and the impacts of those
land use decisions. For example, it would be fully possible, and
likely desirable, to allow information about particular land use
impacts and preferences to flow from similarly situated
landowners outside of the jurisdiction. In other words, the
inputs used by the deciding jurisdiction need not all originate
from within that jurisdiction. Regional information-gathering
protocols might be developed to encourage broader-based
participation. For example, app users located in adjacent
jurisdictions might be allowed to participate in informationgathering initiatives developed by the deciding jurisdiction.
Letting the crowd self-define to a degree could capture both
extraterritorial impacts and intensities of preferences, and could
do so in a manner consistent with the fuzziness of jurisdictional
boundaries as they are experienced on the ground.80
2. Motivating the Crowd
The question of motivation is also tricky. An initial
question is whether people will overcome inertia to participate
rather than free-ride on the efforts of others.81 For many,
posting reviews or offering information to a group appears to be
its own reward. The willingness of people to become involved in
various “citizen scientist” initiatives similarly suggests that the
process of gathering data may be engaging in its own right.82
80

Some creative ideas for restructuring local governance, such as Jerry
Frug’s suggestion that people be allowed to vote extraterritorially, similarly attempt to blur
jurisdictional boundaries. See Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV.
253, 323-30 (1993). Broadened participation protocols within a crowdsourcing initiative
could offer a nonbinding and less threatening way to experiment along these lines.
81
See Stephenson, supra note 2, at 1464-67 (discussing the possibility that
the potential benefits of “many minds” will be undermined by weakened incentives to
exert effort to obtain high-quality informational signals).
82
See, e.g., The Great Backyard Bird Count, BIRDSOURCE.ORG,
http://www.birdsource.org/gbbc (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (annual four-day birdcounting
initiative co-sponsored by the Cornell Lab of Ornithology, the Audubon Society, and Bird
Studies Canada); The Great Sunflower Project, http://www.greatsunflower.org (last
visited Sept. 7, 2012) (backyard bee count to study pollination). These projects are
examples of what Yochai Benkler calls “social production,” in which unused capacity is
effectively donated to collaborative endeavors. Critical to the success of these projects is
the property of “modularity”—the ability to break down the project into chunks that
can later be successfully aggregated. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS:
HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 100-01 (2006). For
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Rewards for participation, such as cash payments or lotteries,
could also address the problem of underparticipation. Property
owners might even be given an incentive through the property
tax system to participate in certain data collection initiatives.83
Overparticipation might instead be a problem,
especially where bits of information submitted by different
people are substitutes rather than complements.84 Information
will not be useful if its flow exceeds the receiving entity’s
capacity to process or respond to it. For example, a recent visit
to SeeClickFix revealed unresolved issues within the City of
Chicago that were reported months earlier. Real-time reporting
would be expected to taper off if users learn that their reports
have no effect; hence, it is possible that initial
overparticipation, followed by inadequate follow up, will
ultimately produce underparticipation. Outfitting feedback
mechanisms with “budget constraints” that limit the amount of
feedback that any given individual could contribute, or that
detect when a duplicate report is being filed, might improve the
quality and diversity of contributions and stem concerns about
system overload.
3. Controlling the Crowd
A separate issue is that inputs may not be
representative or, worse, that they may systematically
disregard the interests of less powerful subgroups. The District
of Columbia’s much-lauded “Apps for Democracy” contest had
the ring of good governance about it and indeed seemed to
generate useful participatory ideas.85 Certainly there is
something to be said for mechanisms that engage the public
and induce participation in governance—and that do so in a
widespread participation to be feasible, these chunks must be of a manageable size for
individuals to contribute; this is the property of “granularity.” See id.; Benkler, supra
note 56, at 336.
83
Cf. Larissa Katz, Governing Through Owners: How and Why Formal
Private Property Rights Enhance State Power, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2029, 2043-51 (2012)
(discussing instances in which the state allocates burdens, like keeping sidewalks free
of snow, to private property owners to harness their unique locational advantages).
84
See Stephenson, supra note 2, at 1468 (“[T]he impact of dividing research
tasks among multiple agents may depend critically on whether the types of information
they are charged with producing are substitutes or complements.”); see also id. at 1467
n.114 (providing a land use planning example in which different pieces of information
would be complementary).
85
See APPS FOR DEMOCRACY, http://www.appsfordemocracy.org/ (last visited
Sept. 28, 2012) (presenting a platform that local governments can use to run such
contests and providing information about the District of Columbia’s contest).
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way that fits with how people live and work.86 But the
possibility that apps can become too democratic, in the sense of
privileging majority interests, deserves attention as well. While
discussion of participatory interfaces always includes the
obligatory reference to the “digital divide,” it is not clear that
disparities in computer access are ultimately the largest
concern. Rather, the worries may largely track those that have
been raised in the context of direct democracy: that privileging
preference aggregation without deliberation, accountability, or
reason-giving could allow some of the most unattractive
motivations for policymaking to carry the day.87
An example will help to illustrate both the concern and
some responses to it. Gallagher v. Magner, an Eighth Circuit
decision which was recently pending review before the
Supreme Court,88 involved a Fair Housing Act challenge to the
housing code enforcement practices of the City of St. Paul.
Those practices included a “user-friendly system” that enabled
residents to report “problem properties” that should be targeted
for code enforcement.89 If code enforcement was undertaken to
make it harder for landlords to offer affordable rental
86

Smartphone apps may actually add an element of fun to public
participation. At the very least, they are more compatible with people’s busy schedules
and short attention spans than more traditional means of public engagement, such as
attending meetings. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, SHIFTING INVOLVEMENTS: PRIVATE
INTEREST AND PUBLIC ACTION 99 (1982) (“That public activities can encroach unduly on
the modern citizen’s time is well expressed in Oscar Wilde’s objection to socialism. It
wouldn’t work, he said, because it would take too many evenings.”).
87
See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J.
1503, 1549 (1990) (“In its substitutive form direct democracy bypasses internal
safeguards designed to filter out or negate factionalism, prejudice, tyranny, and selfinterest.”). Condorcet himself warned of the possibility that prejudices could cause
voters to be less than randomly accurate in their opinions, and he said that where this
is so, a smaller sample from a more carefully selected group of people would yield
better results. CONDORCET, supra note 2, at 62. Note, however, that some of the other
concerns associated with direct democracy, including problems of sequential
decisionmaking, might be alleviated by forms of participation involving more complex
scenario-building, where participants can respond to combinations of interlinked
elements. See Maxwell L. Stearns, Direct (Anti-) Democracy, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
311, 361-62 (2012) (giving an example in which the sequence in which different policies
are considered proves outcome determinative).
88
619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011), cert.
dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide
whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act, and, if so,
what test should be applied to them. Id. The City of St. Paul, petitioner in the case,
withdrew its petition just weeks before oral argument, apparently due to concerns
about the potential effects of a ruling eliminating or weakening disparate impact
causes of action under the Fair Housing Act. See Kevin Diaz, St. Paul Yanks Housing
Fight from High Court, STAR TRIB. (Feb. 10, 2012, 11:51 PM), http://www.startribune.com/
politics/national/139138084.html.
89
See Gallagher, 619 F.3d at 829-30.
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properties in the area (as was alleged in Gallagher), engaging
the public in targeting would be troubling. On the other hand,
code enforcement aimed at keeping landlords from shirking on
maintenance to the detriment of their tenants would carry a
different normative valence. Moreover, wider public
participation might ultimately yield enough violation reports
within well-off neighborhoods to spark a reassessment and
potential recalibration of the stringency of the housing code
provisions.
***
As this discussion suggests, an important goal of any
information platform design initiative must be to engage
participation that is appropriately scaled and representative.
This will not typically mean maximizing participation, and
may indeed require some rationing and gatekeeping. Thus an
initial refinement to the open-ended notion of crowdsourcing
involves defining and cultivating the crowd. Although getting
participation right is crucial to the successful use of new
hyperparticipatory technologies, it has always been a crucial (if
often ignored) element of successful land use planning and
control. The difference is that the new technologies bring the
issue front and center, while the older technologies quietly
privileged certain interests over others. Rather than viewing
new participatory developments as presenting unique threats,
they might well be understood as finally clarifying, and
rendering more tractable, an aspect of land use planning that
has always been significant.
B.

Being Behavioral

Engaging in conscious platform design also offers local
governments the opportunity to more closely align participation
opportunities with the lessons of behavioral law and economics.
The NIMBY dynamic that routinely shuts down new
development is often associated with risk aversion, but it gains
momentum from quirks of human cognition surrounding the
valuation of entitlements and the framing of risk. For example,
the gap between the price one is willing to pay to acquire an
entitlement anew and the price one would demand to give up
that same entitlement—whether denominated as an endowment
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effect, loss aversion, or status quo bias—could influence the way
that existing residents respond to proposed changes.90
Land use decisions occur sequentially. Given
urbanization trends, most proposed changes involve increases
in density or intensity of use. Existing residents largely frame
these changes as potential losses. To be sure, these losses may
be set against some expected gains (for instance, higher density
might promise better infrastructure or improved shopping or
dining opportunities), but losses are weighted more heavily than
gains. Thus, someone who currently enjoys a bucolic, low-density
residential experience might demand a great deal more to give it
up than she would pay to acquire it anew from a baseline of a
denser residential experience. In addition to perceived
asymmetries between gains and losses, consumption of a new
residential surround may be an “experience good” whose value is
difficult to estimate in advance.91 Without experiencing a denser,
more walkable neighborhood first-hand, for example, people may
tend to underrate the benefits, while overrating the advantages
associated with an existing low-density environment.
New information platforms offer interesting opportunities
to align land use planning more closely with human cognition.
Consider loss aversion, which (unlike simple risk aversion)
makes reactions to risky outcomes highly sensitive to the
reference point from which a change is contemplated.92 Prospect
theory suggests that residents who find the promise of a gain
too small to induce them to take on a risk of loss might
nonetheless be willing to take on the same amount of risk in
the hopes of avoiding a loss.93 Thus, whether a given change’s
benefits are framed as a potential gain or as an opportunity to
avoid a potential loss could make a significant difference in the

90

For an application of the endowment effect to the land use context, see, for
example, Georgette C. Poindexter, Light, Air, or Manhattanization?: Communal
Aesthetics in Zoning Central City Real Estate Developments, 78 B.U. L. REV. 445, 500-02
(1998). An endowment effect is just one possible explanation of the willingness-topay/willingness-to-accept gap. See, e.g., Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer,
Willingness To Pay vs. Willingness To Accept: Legal and Economic Implications, 71
WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 85-96 (1993); Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment
Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 193, 194.
91
See generally Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL.
ECON. 311 (1970) (distinguishing goods for which information can be gleaned through
search from those for which information must be obtained through experience).
92
See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 277-80 (1979).
93
See id. at 268-69.
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reception that the change receives.94 Participatory platforms
that simultaneously present land use alternatives for a given
area might help to accomplish such a reframing.
One way in which they might do so is by suggesting the
risks that nondevelopment poses or, put differently, the options
that development of a certain type extinguishes. If one of the
benefits of endorsing Development A is that it would render
impossible Development B, a different decision dynamic is
presented than if A and B are presented seriatim as alternatives
not to each other, but to the status quo. Emphasizing the property
tax implications of particular development alternatives could also
reframe a given development choice as one that offers the chance
to avoid a painful tax increase. At a more basic level, simply
gathering more information about impacts and collecting reports
from those who have experienced particular kinds of changes
could reduce information shortfalls about the effects of those
changes. Doing so can also help to counter loss-averse projections
about how future buyers might view a particular change.
New participatory platforms may thus offer more than
participation opportunities alone. They may also offer the
chance to more actively manage the choice sets that
landowners and other constituents confront, and thus the way
in which decisions are framed. I do not mean to suggest that
engineering the way in which choices are framed is
normatively uncontroversial.95 But it is important to bear in
mind that existing land use decisions are made within a
default frame that may be distortionary as well. Conscious
recognition of the frame and its role will, at the very least,
afford greater participation in the question of framing itself.
C.

Building In Normative Values

Land use decisionmaking implicates some of the most
controversial and important normative questions known to law.
To what extent (and at what scale) should racial, ethnic, and
socioeconomic integration be pursued, and over whose
objections? What patterns of density and space should be
sought? How strictly should land uses of different types be

94

See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the
Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 456-58 (1981).
95
See, e.g., Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99
NW. U. L. REV. 1245, 1248-69 (2005) (critiquing the manipulation of “choice frames” to
achieve the results that a social planner views as most welfare-enhancing).
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separated? What weights should be placed on factors like
security, convenience, and environmental quality? How should
locally undesirable land uses be sited? How much should a
community’s permanence and existing character be privileged
over opportunities for growth or increased access for
newcomers? Under what circumstances should landowners be
forcibly displaced from their homes and businesses?
None of these questions can be answered without
reference to facts as they exist on the ground, but neither can
they be wholly answered by resort to such facts. At some point,
facts run out and normative judgments have to be made.
Making such normative judgments is a quintessential,
nondelegable duty of government. At the same time, the
promise of crowdsourcing lies in its ability to more
meaningfully aggregate information—including information
about preferences—that can be used to inform normative
judgments. Distinguishing value judgments from empirical
questions, and maintaining control over the former while
outsourcing the latter, represent core challenges for
governmental bodies that wish to use new information
aggregation platforms.
Using (unfiltered) crowdsourced information as an input
into a decision process over which the governmental body
retains full control may often be an appropriate alternative. In
some instances, however, such a process may frustrate those it
means to engage if preferences are expressed for alternatives
that turn out to be off the table. The discourse itself may be
unproductive or even harmful to the extent that it fails to
incorporate the local government’s normative commitments.
Alternatively, the local government may find its own priorities
shifting in response to the political feedback these participatory
exercises provide. Again, the anonymity and lack of
deliberation associated with atomized inputs into an
aggregated system produce real concerns.
Another approach is to build value judgments directly
into the interface itself, whether through weightings, side
constraints, or otherwise. A proposal by Jonathan Nash and
Richard Revesz in the context of emissions trading illustrates
one way of approaching the problem.96 Efficiency gains can be
realized through tradable emissions programs, but the fact that
96

See Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Markets and Geography:
Designing Marketable Permit Schemes to Control Local and Regional Pollutants, 28
ECOLOGY L.Q. 569, 624-61 (2001).
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emissions can cause greater or lesser amounts of harm
depending on how concentrated or dispersed they are in time
and space presents a central design difficulty. Nash and Revesz
suggested a website “preclearance” process that would block
problematic emissions transactions while permitting other
transactions to occur.97 Likewise, we can imagine interfaces
that would allow users to register land use preferences (or
engage in transactions based upon them) within a normatively
constrained space.
Here, we can learn from computer programs that have
already been used to augment land use planning. Nearly
fifteen years ago, Elise Bright detailed the operation of one
such program, “A Land Location and Optimization Technique”
(ALLOT).98 This computer model constructs “‘optimum’ future
land use patterns” by combining a GIS-based system for
finding suitable sites with land use demand predictions.99 What
makes the system uniquely applicable to the discussion here is
its ability to build social objectives and legal constraints into
the weightings that are used.100 Such a program illustrates how
local governmental units can retain their roles in setting
normative desiderata, while still allowing room for algorithmand data-driven optimization within the stated parameters. It
also shows how the constraints themselves may reflect
empirically questionable assumptions.
For example, in one of the studies undertaken using the
ALLOT model, “the community had a strong preference for lowdensity, single-family residential development in undeveloped
areas, with multi-family housing confined to areas close to the
highway or to existing commercial nodes.”101 Based on the
opinion of “legal experts,” the model also assumed
that aircraft noise must be treated as a “knockout factor”: that is, if
high noise levels were present, then a pixel simply could not be
selected for residential use no matter how suitable it might be in

97

See id. at 624-28.
Elise Bright, Using the “ALLOT” Model in Land Use Decision-Making, in
DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS IN URBAN PLANNING 229 (Harry Timmermans ed., 1997).
The then-state-of-the-art technology that Bright describes has no doubt become quite
dated in the intervening years. Nonetheless, the level of detail provided by the author
makes this a helpfully concrete example to use in thinking through the role of local
governments in managing and deploying information.
99
Id.
100
See id. at 236.
101
Id.
98
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every other way; the legal consequences of allowing residential
development in these areas would be too severe.102

While less normatively charged than the preference for singlefamily dwellings, the assumptions about airport noise also raise
empirical questions that a more thoroughly “crowdsourced” style
of land use control might be well equipped to address: the value
attributed to quiet, the degree of disruption from a given noise
level, the actual noise levels involved, and the ability to buffer
them through soundproofing or other means.
The government’s role as a platform designer should be
taken seriously. Some decisions are too important or sensitive,
or too closely related to the protection of minority interests to
“crowdsource.” At the same time, the government should not be
too quick to take off the crowdsourcing table information about
actual impacts that could influence the views of “the crowd.”
Unstated empirical assumptions already frequently form
unacknowledged parts of political judgments. Recognizing
whether disagreements are fundamentally about values or about
empirics is central to designing information-harnessing
platforms that will represent improvements over the status quo.
Special challenges are presented by forms of
information that can influence and entrench land use patterns
simply by being disseminated. For example, Microsoft’s
“Pedestrian Route Production” app has fallen under criticism
for offering an algorithm that (according to the patent
application) can “tak[e] the user through neighborhoods with
violent crime statistics below a certain threshold.”103 Similarly,
the ASROmeter app provides information within England and
Wales about “anti-social behavior” in the nearby environment.
Both apps draw on public crime data, but as users respond to
the cues—withdrawing from “dangerous” areas and
frequenting “safe” ones—they may influence the data that will
be generated in later periods.104 These data, and their
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Id.
U.S. Patent No. 20,090,157,302 [0035] (filed Dec. 14, 2007), available at
http://appft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/srchnum.html (search “20090157302”); see also
Allison Keyes, This App was Made for Walking—But Is it Racist?, NPR.org (Jan. 25,
2012), http://m.npr.org/story/145337346?url=/2012/01/25/145337346/this-app-was-madefor-walking-but-is-it-racist.
104
This connects to the concern about “herding” that is sometimes associated
with sequential as opposed to simultaneous contributions of information. See Stephenson
supra note 2, at 1474-76; see also id. at 1476-79 (discussing additional complications with
sequential decisionmaking when information acquisition is endogenous).
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dissemination, may also impact residential decisions,
triggering additional responses.105
Does this suggest that government should also play a
role in cloaking information, as well as in eliciting and sharing
it?106 Such a cure may be worse than the disease. Suppressing
data is likely to be ineffectual as well, given the ability of users
to generate and share their own information. A better approach
may be to use this same information to counteract the selfreinforcing cycle, as by directing more resources to areas that
are skirted by the Pedestrian Route Production app. It should
also be emphasized that the vicious cycles that might be
prompted by certain kinds of information—and efforts to shortcircuit them—are nothing new. In an earlier era, “blockbusters”
attempted to use (or manufacture) information about plans and
intentions to intentionally destabilize neighborhoods.107
Communities trying to maintain neighborhoods against the
threat of “white flight” attempted to suppress informational
signals in the form of “for sale” signs, lest those signals
contribute to more such signals. When these efforts ran aground
for constitutional reasons,108 communities had to find new ways to
arrest self-reinforcing dynamics. New technologies may
heighten the need for such solutions, but they may also
contribute to their formulation.
CONCLUSION
Information is a key input into land use controls, but it
has historically been expensive to obtain and difficult to use.
Technological advances have reduced the cost of collecting and
aggregating information, while theoretical advances have
increased the potential benefits that might be derived from
employing those aggregations. The time is ripe for rethinking
the role that dispersed information can play in land use policy.
To that end, local governments should explore new ways of
crowdsourcing land use.
105

See, e.g., SCHELLING, supra note 63, at 146-47 (observing that residential
changes may set in motion further moves).
106
Cf. STRAHILEVITZ, supra note 39, at 157-58 (observing that the government
may at times use “curtains” to obscure information about certain characteristics).
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See, e.g., AMANDA I. SELIGMAN, BLOCK BY BLOCK: NEIGHBORHOODS AND
PUBLIC POLICY ON CHICAGO’S WEST SIDE 151-62 (2005); Dmitri Mehlhorn, A Requiem
for Blockbusting: Law, Economics, and Race-Based Real Estate Speculation, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 1145 (1998).
108
See Linmark Assoc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (striking
down a ban on “for sale” and “sold” signs).
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Crowdsourcing, as I use the idea here, is not the same
thing as delegation or abdication. The point is not to turn over
land use authority outright to the public, but rather to find
better ways to elicit, aggregate, coordinate, and channel the
preferences, intentions, and experiences of current and future
land-users. Zoners and planners must begin shifting their focus
from the top-down regulation of land use to the development of
information platforms for coordinating land use. These
platforms, however, must be appropriately scaled and
normatively constrained. Slick new apps and fancy websites
undoubtedly will be part of the future of land use control—but
only part. The right theoretical and institutional foundations
are also necessary. Here, I hope to have made a start at
specifying those foundations.

